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PARTICIPATION IN THE CORN PROGRAM: 
THE FARM OWNER/OPERATOR DECISION 
Socioeconomic characteristics, profitability considerations, and opinion regarding agriculture 
programs are analyzed relative to the decisions of Ohio farm operators to (1) establish a com 
acreage base on owned land and (2) set corn acres aside in 1991. Probabilities of establishing 
a base acreage and setting land aside increase as corn acres, specialization in crops, and debt-
asset ratio increase. These findings suggest that farms with these characteristics will be most 
affected by downsizing the com program. Operators who establish a base acreage are 
associated with lower expected yield and higher chemical expenses, suggesting participants 
may be less economically efficient than nonparticipants. 
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PARTICIPATION IN THE CORN PROGRAM: 
THE FARM OWNER/OPERATOR DECISION 
U.S. farm income support programs rely on voluntary participation by farm 
operators to attain their objectives. Therefore, knowledge of the characteristics of 
farm operations which participate in these programs is instrumental to the design, 
operation, and evaluation of the programs. At present the farm policy debate is 
focused on reducing and/or eliminating farm income support programs in order to 
reduce federal expenditures. An understanding of which farm operations participate 
in farm programs is important in evaluating who will be most effected by downsizing 
these programs. 
Previous studies of the socioeconomic characteristics of farm operations which 
participate in farm price and income support programs include Vermeer; Slaughter; 
Bonnen; Lin, Johnson, and Calvin; Townsend and Martin; Johnson and Short; 
Nelson; Reinsel and Banker; Reinsel; and Goodwin and Featherstone. Only 
Slaughter; Townsend and Martin; and Goodwin and Featherstone employ econometric 
analysis; the others use descriptive statistics. As a group, these studies find that 
participation is associated with larger farm me, higher variable cost of production, 
and specialization in crop production. The evidence for other socioeconomic 
characteristics is mixed. 
Another group of studies find that the profitability of participating in farm 
programs significantly affects the decision to participate, and therefore, acreage 
planted by farm operaton. Recent examples of these studies include Menzie and Van 
Meir; Burt and Worthington; Mcintosh and Shideecl; Subotnik; and Chembezi and 
Womack. 
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A third group of studies find that the opinion of farm operators concerning the 
appropriate direction for farm programs (i.e., free market vs. current programs vs. 
mandatory controls, etc.) varies with the characteristics of the farm and farm 
operators. 'Ibis finding suggests that operator opinion regarding farm programs may 
significantly affect the decision to participate. Recent examples of these studies 
include Lasley, Geller and Hoiberg; Edelman and Lasley; Oruem, Otto, and 
Edelman; and Barkley and Flinchbaugh. 
This study combines socioeconomic characteristics, profitability considerations, 
and opinions regarding farm programs into an econometric analysis of the decisions of 
Ohio farm operators (1) to establish a com acreage base and (2) to set com acres 
aside in 1991. Including all three types of variables should reduce misspecification 
problems which can result from not including relevant variables in an analysis. In 
addition, previous studies do not distinguished between the two decisions. Evaluating 
the decisions separately allows differential impacts, if any, to be ascertained. 
The U.S. com program is described in the next section. Empirical models for 
the base acreage and land set aside decisions are developed. Results from the two · 
logit analyses are then presented. Based on the results, conclusions and implications 
are drawn. 
. 
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THE U.S. CORN PRoGRAM 
As with all crops which receive a federal income deficiency payment, the 
decision to participate in the U.S. com program is a two step process. First, the farm 
operator and/or land owner must decide whether to establish an acreage base with the 
Agricultural Stabilimion and Conservation Service (ASCS). Second, in order to 
establish eligibility for deficiency payments and nonrecourse loans in a given crop 
year, a proportion of the acreage base may have to be set aside (i.e., not planted). 
ASCS acreage base for com equals the average number of acres planted and 
considered planted1 to com for harvest during each of the five crop years preceding 
the current crop year (U.S. House of Representatives, Title V, Sec. 503 (b) (1)). In 
1992, 89,lOS entities in Ohio had an ASCS com acreage base (USDA, June 1993, 
p. 7). 
Set-aside or idled acres are •withdrawn from production and must be 
maintained in a soil conserving use to reduce erosion and weed infestations• (USDA, 
May 1990). Percent of the com acreage base which must be set aside varies from 
crop year to crop year, with the primary determinant being the relationship between 
supply and demand. 
Beginning with the 1991 crop, a proportion of the com acreage base is 
designated as flexible (i.e., flex) acres. Flex acres can be planted to program crops, 
as well as any other crop except fruits and vegetables. Crops grown on flex acres are 
eligible for nonrecourse loans (if available) but can not receive deficiency payments 
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(USDA, June 1991, p. 3S). Mandatory flex acres total lS percent of the com base. 
Another 10 percent of the base can be designated as optional flex acres (USDA, 1/91, 
p. 1). 
Besides establishing an ASCS com acreage base, a farm operator also must 
establish a com yield with ASCS. This yield, referred to as the payment yield, is 
calculated by averaging the program yields established for the 1981 through 198S 
crop years after eliminating the highest and lowest program yields (U.S. House of 
Representatives, Title V, Sec. SOS (c)). Program yield equals a farm's proven yield 
for the five previous crop years after eliminating the highest and lowest yields based 
on grain slips, measured bins and certified or determined acres. If proven yields are 
not available, a farm's program yield is the average program yield for similar farms 
in the area as judged by the county ASCS committee (USDA, 1986, p. 2). 
EMPIRICAL MODEl.S 
While the decision to establish a com acreage base with ASCS and the 
decision to set land aside are different, they are interrelated. One common factor is 
the profitability of setting land aside. An acreage base is more likely to be 
established if setting land aside is profitable. Other common factors are the 
characteristics of the operator and business. 
The empirical models developed below apply only to land which a farm 
operator owns. This restriction is imposed because the owner and operator are the 
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same on owned land. On rented land, farming decisions may be jointly made by the 
operator and a different owner. Thus, the decision to establish an ASCS com acreage 
base and to set land aside can be more complex on rented land. 
Profitability of Settin& I and Aside 
The profitability of setting land aside involves comparing the net returns from 
not setting land aside with the net returns from setting land aside. If land is not set 
aside, gross return and production cost are: 
(1) GRNSA • P • YNSA • LNSA 
( 2) VCNSA • LNSA • VCPANSA 
where: GRNSA = Expected Gross Return if Land is Not Set Aside 
VCNSA = Expected Variable Production Cost if Land is Not Set Aside 
P = Expected Price per Bushel at Harvest 
YNSA = Expected Yield per Acre if Land is Not Set Aside 
LNSA = Expected Harvested Com Acres if Land is Not Set Aside 
VCPANSA = Expected Variable Production Cost per Acre if Land is Not Set 
Aside 
In contrast, if land is set aside gross return and production cost equal: 
(3) ORSA = MAX(P, LR) • YSA • ASCSB • (1 - 8) + MAX[O, 
TP - MAX(LR, DPP)) • [l - (8 + +)) • ASCSB •PY 
(4) VCSA = (1 - 8) • ASCSB • VCPASA + 8 • ASCSB • MCPA 
where: ORSA 
VCSA 
LR 
YSA 
ASCSB 
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= Expected Gross Return if Land is Set Aside 
= Expected Variable Production Costs if Land is Set Aside 
= Nonre.course Loan Rate 
= Expected Yield if Land is Set Aside 
= ASCS Com Base Acres 
= Percent of Land Set-Aside 
TP = Target Price 
DPP = Expected Deficiency Payment Price2 
• = Percent of Land in Flex Acres 
PY = Com Program Payment Yield 
VCPASA = Bxpected Variable Production Cost per Acre if Land is Set 
Aside 
MCPA = Bxpected Cost per Acre of Maintaining Set-Aside Land in a 
State Consistent with Farm Program Regulations 
Some of the variables are expectations because the decision to set land aside is 
made before the crop is planted. Fixed costs of production are not considered 
because they are incurred whether or not the farm operator sets land aside. 
To simplify equation 3, it is assumed that a farm operator who sets land aside 
plants mandatory flex acres to corn and does not participate in the optional flex acre 
program. To simplify the comparison between setting land aside and not setting land 
aside, it is also assumed that (1) a farm operator who does not set land aside will 
plant acres of corn equal to the number of corn base acres (i.e., LNSA = ASCSB), 
(2) per acre expected variable cost of production is the same whether or not land is 
set aside (i.e., VCPANSA = VCPASA = VCPA), (3) per acre yield is the same 
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whether or not land is set aside (i.e, YNSA = YSA = Y) and (4) expected deficiency 
payment price equals the expected harvest price (i.e., DPP = P). These assumptions 
do not hold in all situations, but they simplify the comparison without significantly 
altering its conclusions. 
Invoking the simplifying assumptions, combining equations 1through4, and 
rearranging terms generates the following equation: 
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(5) K = MAX(P, LR)• Y • ASCSB • (1 - 8) + MAX[O, TP - MAX(LR,P)] 
• (l - c5 - ~) • ASCSB •PY + 8 • ASCSB • VCPA - 8 • ASCSB • 
MCPA - (P • Y • ASCSB) 
where: K = Net Return to Setting Land Aside Relative to Not Setting Land Aside 
If K > 0, an economically rational farm operator sets land aside. Otherwise, land is 
not set aside. 
Taking the first derivative of equation 5 allows the expected relationship to be 
determined between each variable and the set aside decision. Discontinuities exist in 
the relationship because of the presence of the maximum operators. Specifically, 
three situations exist: (1) target price > loan rate > expected market price; (2) 
target price > expected market price ~ loan rate; and (3) expected market price ~ 
target price > loan rate. Only the last two situations are explored in this paper. One 
reason is that since 1988, the loan rate for com has not significantly effected market 
price because it has been lower than the market clearing price. A second reason is 
that the first derivatives for the first and second situations differ only in that the loan 
rate replaces expected market price in the derivative. Thus, the sign of the derivative 
does not change; only its magnitude changes. 
Assuming set aide is greater than uro (as in 1991), expected maintenance cost 
per acre set-aside, expected yield, and expected price3 are negatively related with the 
decision to set land aside under both situations examined (Table 1). In contrast, 
variable production cost per acre is positively related with the decision to set land 
aside in both situations. 'The latter derivative is consistent with Vermeer's (p. 17) 
finding that the average estimated operating cost of participants in the 1961 corn 
program exceeded the average estimated cost of nonparticipants. Nelson (p. 26) 
found that participants in the 1982 commodity support program had a higher ratio of 
fertilizer and energy expenses to total farm sales. Similarly, Goodwin and 
Featherstone found that, over the 1981 through 1989 period, Kansas farms who 
received government payments had a higher ratio of variable crop production 
expenses to gross value of crops. 
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Payment yield, target price and percent flex acres have conditional 
relationships with the decision to set land aside. If expected price is less than the 
target price, payment yield and target price are positively related to the decision to set 
land aside while percent flex acres is negatively related to the decision. If expected 
price is greater than or equal to the target price, the first derivative of these three 
variables does not exist because no deficiency payment is anticipated. 
Percent of base acreage to be set aside has an indeterminate relationship with 
the decision to set land aside. However, because gross market returns including 
government payments normally exceed variable costs, the decision to participate is 
probably inversely related to the percent set aside. 
Number of base acres also has an indeterminant relationship with the decision 
to set land aside. Examination of the first derivative reveals that, as the set aside 
requirement (6) increases, the first derivative will eventually become negative. All 
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previous studies have found that larger farms have a higher participation rate 
(Vermeer; Slaughter; Bonnen; Lin, Johnson, and Calvin; Townsend and Martin; 
Johnson and Short; Nelson; Reinsel and Banker; Reinsel; Goodwin and Featherstone). 
This consistent finding suggests that, during the crop years examined by these studies, 
8 was not large enough to create a negative relationship. Since 8 in 1991 is similar or 
smaller than 8's during previously examined crop years, corn acreage base is expected 
to be positively related with the decision to set land aside. 
A limit on the amount of deficiency payment a farm operator can receive 
reduces the incentive to set land aside if the limit will be exceeded. Several variables 
influence the likelihood that the payment limit will be exceeded in any given year, but 
the most important variable is base acres. As base acres increase, the likelihood of 
exceeding the payment limit increases. Consequently, the likelihood of setting land 
aside declines. To capture this potential effect, a squared term on corn base acres is 
added to the analysis. This term is expected to have a negative relationship with the 
decision to set land aside. 
Fann Business and Qperator Characteristics 
The same farm business and operator characteristics are likely to be associated 
with the decision to set land aside as with the decision to establish a base acreage. 
The reason is that both decisions are interrelated. However, the degree of association 
may differ since the decisions are also distinct. Because of the interrelationship, this 
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discussion of farm business and operator characteristics will apply to both decisions. 
During the remainder of this section, the interrelated decisions to establish an acreage 
base and set land aside will be termed the decision to participate. 
A com producer who feeds livestock can substitute com purchased off the 
farm for com which could be produced on the set aside acreage. However, 
inconvenience and cost of transporting com to the farm suggest that livestock 
production can act as a deterrent to participating in the com program. Thus, as the 
ratio of total gross sales earned from livestock sales increase (i.e., livestock becomes 
more important), it is hypothesiud that the farm operator will be less likely to 
participate in the com program. Vermeer; Townsend and Martin; Johnson and Short; 
Nelson; Reinsel; and Goodwin and Featherstone all found that non-participants raised 
more livestock than participants. 
This study divides livestock production into milk production and the production 
of other livestock and animal products. Dairy is more labor intensive and time 
sensitive than other livestock production. In addition, milk production in the context 
of Ohio implies the inclusion of com silage in the crop rotation. These considerations 
suggest that dairy producers may be less likely than other livestock producers to 
participate on owned acres. 
Renting com land may influence the decision to participate in farm programs 
on owned com acres. If economically rational, owners of rented land will try to 
maximiz.e rental income. Since 1983, returns to variable costs have generally been 
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larger when a producer participates in the program. Therefore, rental values will 
tend to reflect the added return to being in the program. Consequently, a farm 
operator probably will participate in the farm program on rented acres in order to 
make the rental payment. Participation necessitates transaction costs, such as the time 
necessary to visit the ASCS office and complete the necessary paper work. 
Transaction costs on rented 1and overlap with the transaction costs of being in the 
program on owned land. Combining these two arguments, the greater the percent of 
total com ground that is rented, the more likely the farm operator will participate on 
owned com acres. 
Previous studies provide mixed evidence regarding rented land. Nelson and 
Johnson and Short found that participants had a larger amount of rented farmland than 
did non-participants. Goodwin and Featherstone found the opposite relationship for 
rented acres as a percent of total acres, while Vermeer found an indeterminant 
relationship. 
The com program provides farm operators a known income target price and a 
potential floor on cash market price via the nonrecourse loan. These features are 
likely to be especially important to farm operators who have more financial risk. 
Therefore, it is hypothesiz.ed that farm financial risk will be positively related to the 
decision to participate. Townsend and Martin found that financial risk had an 
insignificant relationship with the ·set-aside decision of Indiana farm operators, but 
their analysis included only a limited number of variables. 
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Vermeer's (p. 32) appraisal of written comments from respondents to a survey 
concerning the 1961 feed grain program found that opposition to government farm 
programs was a re-occurring reason for not participating. Lasley, Geller, and 
Hoiberg; Oruem, Otto and Edelman; Edelman and Lasley; and Barkley and 
Flinchbaugh are recent examples of studies which found that farm and farm operator 
characteristics are associated with farm operators' opinions regarding the need for and 
type of farm programs. Given these findings, it is hypothesiml that an operator's 
support for government farm programs will be related positively with the decision to 
participate'. 
E,Uimatcxf Moclels and Data 
The dependent variable in the analysis of the base acreage decision and in the 
analysis of the set aside decision is binary. It takes a value of one if the operator has 
a com base acreage or expects to participate in the 1991 land set aside program. 
Since the dependent variables are qualitative, several analytical tools including 
linear discriminant analysis, probit, and logit can be used. Linear discriminant 
analysis is strictly applicable only when the underlying variables are jointly normal 
with equal co-variance matrices. Thus, it is not appropriate in this study because 
some of the independent variables are qualitative (Anderson). Probit and logit are 
similar and generate similar results (Capps and Kramer, p. S8). Therefore, the 
choice between them is arbitrary. For this study, logit is used because the calculation 
of probabilities is easier. The specific logit procedure is the one contained in the 
SHAZAM computer package5• 
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The logit equations are estimated using data from a survey of Ohio farm 
operators conducted in early 1991. One thousand sixteen randomly selected operators 
were interviewed (Stout Gt al., p. 1). The operators were asked about their farm 
enterprises, households, and opinions concerning farm-related issues. They were also 
asked about their com program payment yield and base acreage on land they owned, 
as well as whether they expected to participate in the 1991 com program on owned 
acres. 
Of the 1,016 farm operators surveyed, S43 had owned com acres and complete 
information for all variables incorporated into the base acreage analysis. Because a 
farm operator can set land aside only if a com acreage base exists, it is necessary to 
eliminate from the set-aside analysis the 202 observations which did not have a com 
acreage base. Furthermore, only eight farm operators had an expected price at 
harvest which exceeded the target price of $2. 1S. Because of the conditional nature 
of the first derivatives for some independent variables, the small number of these 
observations makes their analysis infeasible. Consequently, they are eliminated from 
the set-aside analysis. In total, 341 observations are included in the set-aside analysis. 
Of these 341 observations, 243 or 71 percent expected to set land aside in 1991. 
Owned com acres is used in the base acre decision because base acres do not 
exist for farm operators who have not established an ASCS base'. Therefore, farm 
me is measured as owned corn acres in the base acreage decision. For the same 
reasons discussed with regard to base acres in the set aside decision, owned corn 
acra and owned corn acres squared are hypothesi7.ed to be positively and negatively 
related, respectively, with the decision to establish a com base. 
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Owned corn acres, owned ASCS com acreage base, expected com yield, com 
program payment yield, and expected com price at harvest are taken directly from 
survey questions. Financial situation of the farm is measured as the farm debt-to-
asset ratio. Percent of com acres rented is calculated as rented com acra to total 
com acra. Importance of livestock production other than milk is measured as the 
ratio of gross sales earned from livestock and livestock products, excluding milk, to 
total gross farm sales. Similarly, importance of milk production is measured as a 
ratio of milk sales to total gross farm sales. Com expenses per acre is measure as the 
sum of fertilizer and pesticide expenses per acre because they are the only expenses 
available7• However, these two expenses account for 75 percent of the variable costs 
of producing com in the com belt (USDA, July 1992, p. 12). 
Opinion of the farm operator regarding government programs is measured as 
two binary variables. The first equaled one if the farm operator opposed government 
programs in agriculture. The second equaled one if the farm operator was neutral to 
government programs in agriculture. Base value for both dummy variables is that the 
farm operator suppOrted government programs in agriculture. 
To summarize, the following logit regression equations are estimated: 
lS 
(6) Yi = a + P10~ + P~Si + P,FP& + P.EYi + P,P~ + pµi + p,MSi + 
PaD~ + P,OFi + P1oOOPi + PuNGPi +~ 
(7) ~ = 'Y + A1BA; + ~j + A,FPF, + ~EYJ + A,EPj + M Yj + A,PR; + 
where: 
Aal..Sj +~SJ+ A11,DA; + A110FJ + A1200PJ + A13NGPj +eJ 
Yi 
~ 
OA 
AS 
FPE 
BY 
PR 
LS 
MS 
DA 
OF 
OOP 
NGP 
BA 
BB 
BP 
AY 
a, Pt 
'Y, A. 
~' 8.i 
= Farmer i Did or Did Not Have a Com Base (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
=Farmer j Expected to Set Land Aside (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
= Owned Com Acres 
= Owned Com Acres Squared 
= Fertili7.er Plus Pesticide Expenses per Acre 
= Expected Average Yield 
= Percent of Total Com Acres Rented 
= Percent of Total Farm Sales from Livestock and Livestock 
Products Excluding Milk 
= Percent of Total Farm Sales from Milk 
= Farm Debt-to-Asset Ratio 
= Operator Off-Farm Income 
= Oppose Government Program in Agriculture (Binary Variable) 
= Neutral Toward Government Program in Agriculture (Binary 
Variable) 
= Com Base Acres 
= Com Base Acres Squared 
= Expected Average Price at Harvest 
= ASCS Yield 
= Regression Parameters 
= Regression Parameters 
= Random Error Terms 
The policy parameters on set aside, flex acres, and target price are established 
nationally and thus, are the same for all farm operators. Hence, they are not included 
in this cross sectional analysis. For 1991, the set-aside requirement equalled 7.S 
percent (USDA, January 2, 1991, p. 1). Target price was $2.7S per bushel. 
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Ram.TS 
All independmt variables in the base acreage decision are significant at least at 
the 10 percent level and have their hypothem.ed sign (Table 2). With respect to the 
set aside decision, all independent variables are significant at least at the 10 percent 
level except for expected price, livestock sales ratio, and chemical expenses per acre 
(Table 3). The significant variables have their hypothesized signs. 
Generally the same variables are significantly associated with the two decisions 
which jointly compose the farm program participation decision. However, livestock 
sales ratio is negatively related with the decision to establish a base acreage at the five 
percent level of significance, but is insignificant with the decision to set land aside. 
Chemical expenses per acre is positively related with the decision to establish a base 
acreage at the one percent level of significance, but is insignificant with the decision 
to set land aside. 
Probability of establishing an acreage base on owned land increases at a 
decreasing rate as owned com acres increase. Similarly, probability of setting owned 
land aside increases at a decreasing rate as com base acres increase. A likely 
explanation for these comparable findings is the limit on deficiency payments. 
If a farm operator supported the need for government programs in agriculture, 
he/she is significantly more likely to establish a base acreage and set land aside. This 
finding reflects the role which participant's attitude play in determining the ease with 
which policy makers can attain policy objectives when participation is voluntary. 
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To gain further insight into the relative importance of the independent 
variables, a change in the probability of establishing a com acreage base and setting 
land aside for a given change in the independent variable is calculated. The change in 
probability is determined by first calculating the probability that a com base is 
established (land is expected to be set aside) with all independent variables at their 
mean value'. Next, for the non-binary variables the probability is recalculated with 
the value of one independent variable changed to equal to its mean value plus (0.10 
times its standard deviation). The differences between the two probabilities represents 
the change in the probability for a 0.10 standard deviation change in the independent 
variable'. Because the change in probability is calculated using the standard deviation 
of the independent variable, it accounts for the relative variability of the independent 
variable. For the binary variables, change in probability is calculated using the same 
procedure but with the binary variable set equal to 7.ero and then one. 
The farm operator's opinion of farm programs has the highest change in 
probability and thus can be considered the most important characteristic associated 
with whether a farm operator establishes a com acreage base or expects to set land 
aside (Tables 2 and 3). Number of owned com acres (com base acres in the set aside 
decision) has the next highest probability change. Percent of total com acres rented, · 
debt-to-asset ratio, and milk sales ratio round out the top five highest probability 
changes in the base acreage decision. Percent of total com acres rented, milk sales 
ratio, and farm debt-to-asset ratio complete the top five in the set aside decision. 
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SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPuCA110NS 
This study combines profitability considerations, socioeconomic characteristics, 
and opinions regarding farm programs into an analysis of the decisions of farm 
operators to (1) establish a com acreage base and (2) set land aside. Data from a 
survey of Ohio farm operators for 1990 is used to conduct the analysis. 
Results of this study suggest that larger farms, farms specia1izm in crop 
production, and more highly leveraged farms are more likely to participate in the com 
program. Assuming that the decision to participate in the com program is rational, 
the respective choice of participants and nonparticipants maximi7.C their well being. 
Therefore, these results in tum suggest that reducing or eliminating the com program 
will have a greater impact on farms which are larger, more specializm in crop 
production, and more leveraged. 
Separation of milk production from production of other livestock products 
reveals that milk production is more likely to be related to non-participation than 
production of other livestock. Specifically, unlike other livestock production, milk 
production is significantly and negatively associated with the decision to set land 
aside. 
Neither yield nor chemical expenses per acre are encompassing measures of 
economic efficiency, but the findings in this study that farm operators who do not 
have base acres have higher expected yield and lower chemical expenses per acre 
suggest that com program participants may be less economically efficient. 
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The finding that chemical expenses is positively and significantly associated 
with the decision to establish a com base is consistent with previous studies which 
find that participants have higher variable production expenses than nonparticipants. 
This consistent finding suggests that farm programs act as an umbrella for higher 
variable cost producers. Umbrella is used because it is not possible to distinguish 
between producers who participate in farm programs because they are high cost 
producers in a free market situation and those who increase their use of variable 
inputs in response to the greater return provided by the farm program relative to the 
free market. The former use the program to survive, while the latter use the program 
to expand production. The latter, therefore, allocate farm program benefits between a 
larger use of variable inputs per participating acre and the well-recogniz.ed 
capitali.7.ation of program benefits into land values (Melichar). 
Last, results of this study suggest that future analysis of acreage response in 
the presence of farm programs should include variables other than those needed to 
calculate economic returns to participation. In particular, inclusion of variables such 
as farm size, specializ.ation in livestock (especially milk), percent of acres rented, and 
debt-to-asset ratio, may help explain why participation rates have steadily increased 
over time. 
ENDNOTFS 
1. Acreage considered planted includes set-aside acreage, acreage prevented from 
planting due to natural disaster, flex acres, and other acreage as specified in section 
S03 (c) of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade A.ct of 1990. 
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2. Consistent with the method used to calculate deficiency payments in 1991, 
expected deficiency payment price would equal the expected U.S. market price during 
the first five months of the com marketing year (i.e., September through January). 
3. If the loan rate exceeds the expected market price, the first derivative of the loan 
rate is {Y • ASCSB • (1 - ~) - [(l - ~ - ~) • ASCSB •PY]}. Because Y usually 
exceeds or equals PY, the usual relationship is: the higher the loan rate, the less 
likely a producer will set land aside. 
4. Previous analyses of the participation decision often included age and off-farm 
income. However, conflicting conceptual arguments as well as conflicting empirical 
results suggest these variables are unlikely to be significant. Therefore, they were not 
included in this analysis. As a sensitivity test of this decision, age and off-farm 
income were added to both regression equations. As expected, they were 
insignificant. 
5. The probit procedure in SHAZAM was employed as a sensitivity test. As 
expected, its results were similar to those generated by the logit analysis. 
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6. Because farm operators who do not have a base acreage also do not have a 
payment yield, payment yield can not be included in the analysis of the base acreage 
decision. 
7. Maint.enance cost of setting land aside is not used in this analysis because 24 
percent of the farm operators who had a com acreage base did not report a 
maintenance cost. Furthermore, farm operators who did not expect to set land aside 
made up 69 percent of the nonrespondents on maintenance cost but only 31 percent of 
the operators who had a base acreage. Thus, the nonrespondents were highly skewed 
toward farm operators who did not expect to set land aside. This finding suggests 
that many operators who did expect to set land side may have had only limited 
knowledge to estimate their maintenance cost. Maintenance cost for those who 
reported it ranged from SO to $500. Therefore, measurement error may be substantial 
for maintenance cost among producers who do not expect to set land aside. 
8. The formula used to calculate the probability (P) is: P = 1 I (1 + EXP(-X 'B)). 
EXP is the exponential function, X is the vector of independent variables and B is the 
vector of estimated coefficients (Pindyck and Rubinfeld; Fomby, Hill and Johnson). 
9. The change in probability also was calculated using the mean value minus 0.10 
times the standard deviation. The values were similar to those derived using the 
mean value plus 0.10 times the standard deviation. 
TABLE 1. HYPO'l'llalZED RELA110NSBIPS BETwEl!'.N PROnT ACCOUN11NG VARIABLES AND 'IRE DEclsION 
TO SET LAND AsmE 
FntsT DBRIVATIVB 
VARIABLE TARGET PRlcE > ExPBCTED PRICE ExPBCTED PRicE ~ TARGET PRICE 
> LoAN RATE > LoAN RATE 
Production Cost per Aete (VCPA) 8 • ASCSB 8 • ASCSB 
Maintenance Cost per Acre (MCPA) -8 • ASCSB -8 • ASCSB 
(-8) • (P • Y) + [TP - P] • (-8) • (P • Y) + 8 • VCPA -
(1 - 8 - •> • PY + 8 • VCPA - (8 • MCPA) 
ASCS Base Acreage (ASCSB) (8 • MCPA) 
Expected Yield per Acre (Y) (-8) • (P • ASCSB) (-8) • (P • ASCSB) 
Payment Yield per Aete (PY) [TP - P] • (1 - 8 - +) • ASCSB Does not exist 
-a • (Y • ASCSB) - ((1 - a - •> • -8 • (Y • ASCSB) 
Expected Price per Bushel (P) ASCSB •PY] 
Target Price (TP) (1 - a -+) • (ASCSB •PY) Does not exist 
-(P • Y • ASCSB) - [TP - P] • -(P • Y • ASCSB) + (ASCSB • 
ASCSB • PY + (ASCSB • VCPA) - (ASCSB • MCPA) 
Percent Land Set-Aside (8) '\'CPA) - (ASCSB • MCPA) 
Percent Flex Acres (+) -[TP - P] • ASCSB • PY Does not exist 
, . . . 
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TABLE 2. FADI PJlODUCDON AND OPERATOR CllARACTERIS'IICS AssoclATED 
WITR THE DEasl:ON TO Esl'ABI.JSR A CORN BASE, Omo, 1'91. 
Constant 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Owned Com Acres 
Owned Com Acres Squared 
Com Expenses per Acre 
Expected Yield 
9' of Total Com Acres Rented 
Livestock Sales Ratio 
Mille Sales Ratio 
Fann Debt-Asset Ratio 
Opinion on Ag Programs• 
Oppose 
Neutral 
Summary Statistics 
McFadden R2 
Number of Observations 
9' Correctly Predicted 
F.sTIMATBD 
COEFFICIENT 
3.516600 
0.007371 
-0. ()()()()()5 
0.011176 
-0.012170 
1.217500 
-1.000600 
-0.994370 
1.736500 
-2.489400 
-1.285400 
0.26 
543 
84.0 
CHANGE JN 
T-RATIO OR PROBABIUI'Y 
F-RATIO- AT MEAN" 
3.98··· NAC 
2.56 •• 0.0061 
-1.93•• NAC 
2.28··· 0.0022 
-1.11·· 
-0.0016 
2.s8-· 0.0026 
-2.29··· 
-0.0022 
-2.44··· 
-0.0022 
1.94•• 0.0023 
47.91··· 
-0.2484 
-0.1239 
•, ••, ••• indicates a significant coefficient at 10, 5 and 19' level, respectively. 
'One-tailed test is used for the single variables. F-ratio is reported for the ag 
program opinion variables. 
bFor a description of how the probabilities are calculated see the text. 
cNot applicable. Effect of owned com acres squared is included with owned com 
acres. 
~ference value for the dummy variables is: support ag programs. 
SOURCE: Ohio Fann Operator Survey, 1990, and Original Calculations 
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TABLE 3. FARM PllODUCDON AND 0PERATO:R CIIARACIERIS'11CS ~CIATED 
WfiB THE DEOSION TO SET AsmE LAND, Omo, 1991. 
CHANGE JN 
INDEPENDENT EsTIMATED T-RATIO OR. PR.OBABIUI'Y 
VARIABLE COBFFICIBNT F-RATIO- AT MEAN" 
Constant -1.849500 -0.97 NAC 
Com Base Acres 0.009207 4.11··· 0.0288 
Com Base Acres Squared -0.000006 -3.88··· NAC 
Com Expenses per Acre 0.005566 1.22 0.0025 
Expected Yield -0.012381 -1.64. -0.0037 
Payment Yield 0.018318 1.60. 0.0037 
Expected Price 0.004397 0.71 0.0014 
9' of Total Com Acres Rented 1.275500 2.86··· 0.0061 
Livestock Sales Ratio 0.433000 0.85 0.0018 
Milk Sales Ratio -1.286600 -2.44••• -0.0052 
Farm Debt-Asset Ratio 1.181700 i.74•• 0.0038 
Opinion on Ag Programsd 
Oppose -1.227400 9.69··· -0.2130 
Neutral -1.163700 -0.2119 
Summary Statisti"s 
McFadden R2 0.19 
Number of Observations 341 
9' Correctly Predicted 76.2 
•, ••, •••indicates a significant coefficient at 10, 5, and 19' level, respectively. 
'One-tailed test is used for the single variables. F-ratio is reported for the ag 
program opinion variables. 
"For a description of how the probabilities are calculated see the text. 
cNot applicable. Effect of com base acres squared is included with com base acres. 
~eference value for the dummy variables is: support ag programs. 
SOURCE: Ohio Farm Operator Survey, 1990, and Original Calculations 
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